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In accordance with paragraph 25 of  the Interinstitutional Agreement of29 October 1993 
the Commission is presenting this report to the budgetary authority on the app'tication.of 
the Interinstitutional Agreement and on the amendments which need to' be made to it in 
the light of  experience. 
Implementation of  the  [nterinst~tutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 
The Commission has reviewed both the application of the tinanciaf framework over the 
period .1993-99 and the implementation of  the provisions of the Agreement designed to· 
improve the budgetary procedure. 
•  The period divides into two as regards application of the financial framework. · From 
1993  to  1996 economic  gro~h was  not  as  high  as  expected,  demonstrating that  a 
margin  for  unf()reseen  expenditure of 0.01%,  GNP was  inade<.Juate;  annu~l budgets 
were at levels very close to the financial  perspective ceilings and there was significant 
underspending in 1994 and 1995.  By contrast, froni 1997 onwards economic growth . 
picked  up,  a  stricter  budgetary  policy was. introduced  leaving  substantial· margins 
beneath the financial perspective ceilings and outturn"figures improved distinctly.  · 
.  . 
o  From the  point of view of the  improvement of the  budgetary  procedure,  the  1993 
· Interinstitutional Agreement has failed to produce lasting·solutionsJti .the problems of 
classrfication of expenditure and legal bases.  On the other hand, in accordance with 
their pledge to improve implementation of the 1982 Joint Declaration. the institutions 
came to an  agreement on  the question of entering financial  provisions  in  legislative 
instr~ments (Joint Declaration of 6  March  1995).  Moreover,  even  though· the  first 
application resulted  in  a dispute, the  interinstitutional collaboration procedure set up 
by  the  1993  Interinstitutional  Agreement  worked  satisfactorily,  going  beyond what 
_  had  been  agreed  by  the  institutions.  This. must,  however,  still  be  confirmed  in  the-
budgetary procedure for 1999. 
-Guidelines for a new agreement 
Since  the  verdict  on  the  1993  Interinstitutional  Agreement  ts  b.roadly _positive,  it  ts 
proposed that the fundamental rules be retained. 
However,  c:ertain  provisions  could  be  amended  in  the  light  of experience  and  also 
because of the tighter financial  constraints. proposed  by  Agenda 2000.  The proposals 
concern the management of the financial framework and the budgetary procedure proper. 
For  reasons  of simplification  and  rationalisation,  the  Con1rnission ·is  also  taking  the 
opportunity  offered  by  the  renewal  of the  lnterinstitutiorwl  Agn.:cmcnt  to  propose 
updating and consolidating all the  interinst~tutional agree1i1ents and joint declarations on 
budgetary matters.· e  The .amendments  or  additions  which  the  Commission  is  proposing  to  prov1s1ons 
relating to the management of  the financial framework are essentiully on three points: 
In  a  context where the  financial  framework  will  offer less  latitude  over the  period 
2000-2006,  the  Commission  is  proposing  that .the  management  of the  financial 
perspective  be  given  an  extra  margin  of flexibility.  The  aim  would  be· to  allow 
transfers,  during  and  in  accordance  with  the  budgetary  procedure,  of allocations 
between headings 3 and 4 up to a limited amount, without escaping the need to leave a 
margin unused.  Part of  any balance remaining at the end of a year could give rise to a 
limited  amount of additional  expenditure  in  the  course  of the  following  year  on 
requirements of  significant political  importance to be agreed in advance. 
In  line with the new financial management arrangements proposed  l(>r the Structural 
Funds,  the Commission takes the  view that  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  provide  in 
principle for the transfer to subsequent years of allocations fix the  hmJs which have 
not been used.  Dccommitments would be governed by  the relevant provisions of the 
Financial Regulation. 
- The  financial  perspective  will  have  to  be  adjusted  if new  Member  States join the 
Community  by  incorporating,  beneath  the  expenditure  ceilings.  the  margins  len 
available with an eye to enlargement.  The Interinstitutional Agreement should leave 
open -the  possibility of revising the  financial framework  01i  this occasion should the 
allocations planned for enlargement prove inadequate. 
•  As  regards  improvement  of  the  budgetary  procedure  and  interinstitutional 
collaboration,  the  Commission  is  proposing,  m  addition  to  the  consolidation  of 
existing agreements and joint declarations, 
to determine in  the  Interinstitutional Agreement the classification of existing budget 
headings and to have the classification of  new headings agreed by the two arms of the 
'budgetary authority under the conciliation procedure;  should they  tail  to agree, the 
Commission's proposal would be deemed approved; 
- to  relax  the  provisions of the  Joint. Declaration  of 6 March  1995  on  the  entry  of 
financial  provisionsc,jn legislative instruments in·l>rder  to  restore a certain margin of' 
manoeuvre  to  the  budgetary  authority  in  a  context  where  the  scope  of legislative 
codecision has been extended by the Treaty of  Amsterdam; 
to clarify, if it has not already been done, the issue of  legal bases; 
to formalise the recently observed conciliation practice which  has  been extended to 
eover aU expenditure. 
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! INTRODUCTION 
Paragraph 25  of  the  Interinstitutional · Agreement  of  29 October 1993  requires  the· 
Commission to present, before I July 1998, a report on the application of the Agreement· 
and on the amendments.  which need to be made to it in the I  ight of  ~xpericnce. 
.  -
The current agreement followed on from .the one conclutied in  19~~- It took over most tif 
the· prim:iplcs  and  objectives of the  earlier  one,  subject  to  c~rtain  clarificatiims  and 
•  •  <  •  ...  '  ••  •  • 
. additional  provisions.  Its  aims  are  twofold:  to· impose  hudgctary  discipline  in'  a· 
framework  ensuring  that  adequate  resources  arc  available  ano  offering  scope· for  an 
· orderly growth in expenditure to match the  priorities  set in  the· medium  terr'n,  and  to· 
·improve the annual budgetary ·procedure by means of closer collaboration between the 
institutions. 
.  . 
This report sets out.what can be learned from.the application of the 1993 Agreement and 
proposes  a  number  of guidelines  for  renewal  beyond  1999. ·  These  proposals· are 
consistent  with  others·  presented  by  the  Commission  conccrnihg  the  new  financial 
framework, therefor~ otthe CAP, the new Stiuctur~l Funds ·regulations, the introduction 
of  pre-accession aid ~nd the op~'ration ofthe Guarantee Fund..  .  . 
Immediately  after· ·pre~enting  this  report,  the  Commission  will  propose  a ·new 
interinstitutional  agrc~ment, with a  fina~cial perspective framework, to  he agreed hy  the 
instituti<>ns  fc>r  2000-2006, as an iniegral  part.  The new agreemerit should he concluded 
in time to be applied for the preparation of  the 2000 budget, the first one 'to  he concerned. 
The Commission will also present proposals tor appropriate arnendmcnts to the Council 
De'cision of-31_ October 1994 on budgetary discipline. 
I.  .-IMPLEMENTATION OF .THE  INTERINSTITUTIONAL  AGREEMENT 
· · OF i9 OCTOBER 1993 
A.  Application·  of  the financial framework  1 
The 1in.ancial  framework·1or  1993-99 was set  by  the  Edinhurgf)  European  Council  in 
December_ 1992.  It was endorsed by the European Parliament in  Odooer l  99~ when the · 
Interinstitutional Agreement was concluded.  At that·point some or the  1994 expenditure 
. ceilings were raised by small amounts to allow non-compulsory expenditure to· grow thaf 
year in line with the maximum rate of  increase. .  ·· · 
Apart from the unavoidable adjustment-which had to be made in  1_995· to  accommodate · 
the  new-resources.and. requirements of a  Union  with  three  new  Me1i1ber  States,  the 
financial framework has not been amended,!: whereas the previous 1inaricial  perspective ' 
I  The principaUigurcs.on the application of the financial  framework arc shown in  thct<iblcs and  ~;harts· 
annexed. 
2  · The financial  framework  ~pplying from  1993  to  1999~ with .the .technical  adjustments  in  line  with. 
movements in  prices and GNP and adjustments required by conditions of.implcmcntation, is set out in 
Table L  Table 2  compares this  framework  with  the  ap!Jropriations ;entered  i!1  the  budget and the 
outturn·figures. table for  1988-92 was revised seven times.  What is  more, the present fi·amcwork  looks 
set to expire leaving substantial margins available beneath the ceilings. 
Apart  from  the  specific  features  of  the  original  financial  f"ramcwork,  the  main 
cxplanations or these  results  lie  in  the  development  or thc  lllacrocconomic  situation 
throughout  the  period  and  the  budgetary  policy  guidclim:s  governing  the  IJnion's 
finances.  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  the  actual  application  of the  Agreement's 
provisions on budgetary discipline must he viewed., 
I.  The macroeconomic context and hudgelary guidelines 
The application of  the financial framework can be divided into two periods. 
(a)  1993 to 1996 
•  Growth appreciably lower than expected 
The growth assumption underlying the financial perspective table was an annual average 
rate  in  real terms of 2.5% over the entire period.  Actual  growth from  1993  to  1996 in 
relation  to  '1992,  on  the  basis  of  the  most  recent  ligures  currently  available 
(November 1997), was only an annual average of 1.5
1Yc,.  This avcrage did, indeed, cover 
som<.:  fairly  substantial  fluctuations which were not accurately rdkctcd in  the  forecasts 
us<.:d  f(>r  the successive annual technical adjustments (sec ('hart I). 
This unexpectedly low real growth rate had two consequences: 
- the narrow safety margin oi"O.OI% of"(jNP which had been ldt available bctwecn.thc 
own resources ceiling and the limit on total appropriations for payments was used up 
completely at the very outset (see Table 2 and Chart 2); 
- actual own resources fell  well short of the forecasts used for drawing up the budget, 
generating negative balances which had to be accommodated beneath the ceiling.· 
The adjustment of the financial perspective following enlargement of the Union in 1995 
eased these tight constraints which otherwise would probably  have meant lowering the 
ceilings in the financial  framework itself, as is allowed by  the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 8  of the  Agreement,  in  order to  ensure c<Jmpliance  with  the  own  resources 
ceiling.  In  addition  to  raising  the  ceilings  to  cover the  requirements connected  with 
enlargement, this adjustment  restored  the  margin  available  beneath  thl:  own  resources 
ceiling and then raised it to 0.02% of  GNP for the end of the period. 
•  . Annual budgets very close to the expenditure ceilings 
During the first lour years of  application of the financial  framework, the budgets adopted 
-each year (including supplementary and amending budgets) left only very smC;tll  margins 
in  appropriations tor commitments beneath the ceilings set in  the  financial  perspective 
(see Table 3 and Chart3).  f'or the most part these margins were beneath the agricultural 
guideline.  The margins for headings 3, 4 and 5 were negligiblC.  Although the margins in 
total appropriations for payment were bigger, they were still on the small side. 
2 •  Marked umlcrspcnding in  1994 and 1995 
For both these years apprppriations 'total I  ing around I  ·:Cl J  .5  hi Ilion f(>r  commitments and 
J:cu X.5 ·billion lor payments were not used and not' carried qver to' the  f(>llowing  year. 
In  terms  ol  amounts,  twil  areas  or  expenditure  were  1i1ainly. c<\i1ccrned  l~y  this 
under-utilisation (see Table 3 and Charts 3 to 5): 
- expenditure  on  the  common  agricultural  policy, mainly  because  or the  relatively 
. favourable conditions on a number of markets and an increase in costs connected with 
. the '1992.  refor~ that was riot as high. ·as  expected.  The volume of  appropri~tions not 
. used dropped sharply, however, in 1996;  · 
· expenditure on the StruCtural  Funds, the reason being the time  taken to adopt ·and 
introduce the arrangements for the new programming period which started in  1994. 
·.This  mainly  concerned  objectives 2, · 5a  and  5b  and  the  Community  initiatives. 
Utilisation  for  objective  1  operations. was  satisfactory.  In  ·accordance. with 
paragraph 10 or the Agreement the allocations not used in  I 994 and  I  <)<)5  gave ri'sc  to 
tninsfers of ECU 3.1  billion in appropria,tions  l(lr commitments :to  subsequent years. · 
I Jti l isation  rates  lclr  appropriaticms  f()r  _payments  were even lower.  llowever, ·there . 
was  a  marked  upturn  in  1996: during  that  year  the  outturn  in  com'mitments -was 
slightly (EC!J 300 milli<in) higher than  ~he ir1itial  allocation  f(H·  the Structural  Funds, 
thus _clearing a  li ttlc of the accumulated backlog.'  The improwment in  uti I  isatioH rates 
was even more marked fix payments.  -
In relative terms there was also an appreciable slowdown, from 1995  on~ards, ii1  the · 
·clearance of  commitments for external action and, to ~ lesser extent, inter~al policies  .. 
(b)  Fr.oin 1997 onwards 
. In  _a. number of respects  1997 marked a  maj~r turning  poit?t  111  the application of the 
financial framework. 
•  A more favourable economic situation 
According to the most ·recent economic (()recasts available, the real  growth rate  for  the 
. · !Jnion's GNP in  the_ last three ycars\of the period c<>vered  by  thl:  lin.<mcial  perspective 
should  average  just  over  2.YYc1  a  year (sec  Cl1arl  l ).  'l'hl:  111argin  hl'lwl:l:n  the  own · 
.  •  •  1  •  • 
resources ceiling and the I  i mit on total appropriations li>r  payl1ien!s should thnc  ((lr;e  he 
0.03% of  GNP as forecast at the time of  enlargement. 
•  A new approach to budget policy 
A  new budget policy approach became evident in  1997, was accentuated when the  1.998 
budget was established and should continue  in  1999,  at least in.  the  preliminary draft 
budget that the Commission will be presenting.· 
Prior to this the budgetwas drafted mainly by reference to the ceilil1g set by the financial . 
perspectiye.  The  margins  which  could .  .be  left  available beneath  these  ceilings .were 
tl\erefore  at  the  heart of the. debate between the  institutions  and  tended  inevitably  to ' 
contract as the budgetary procedure ad~anced m~d compromises had  L<>  be  l~1und qn the 
priorities to be set  hom 1997 onwards the limit on the- increase in total spending, linked 
'  3 to the budgetary restrictions applied by Member States at national level became the main 
reference marker for spending both on operations and on the institutions' staff. 
The  budgets  adopted  for  1997  and  1998  are  based  on  a  very  small  increase  in  total 
appropriations  for  payments of 0.5% and  1.4
1Yo  respectively  in  nominal  terms, thereby 
leaving very substantial margins (0.07% then 0.13% of GNP) beneath an own resources 
ceiling which itself was rising (sec Table 2 and Chart 2). 
-· 
Total appropriations lor commitments increased by more (3
1Yt,  in  I  ()<)7  and 2.1% in 199X), 
meaning that the underlying ratio between commitments and payments in  the  financial 
framework was increased.  Account was thus taken of the pattern  in  earlier years of a 
slower rate of clearance of commitments.  Moreover, as the allocations in  commitments 
for structural operations had privileged status, they had to be entered in  the budget in full. 
As a result, the margins available in the  1997 budget beneath the expenditure ceilings in 
commitments are still very small and mainly concern agricultural spending. ·In the 1998 
budget,  on  the  other  hand,  large  margins  are  Jell  for  all  the  headings  with  the'  sole. 
exception  of  structural  operations,  where  the  allocations  have  privileged  status 
(see Table 3 ). 
o  The improvement in outturn was confirmed in  1997 
The improvement in  budget outturn which  began to  show th,rough  in  1996 was by and 
large  confirmed  in  1997.  All  headings  were  concerned  fi.1r  commitments  with  the 
exception of heading 2.  The improvement was even more marked  in  payments  for all 
\ 
headings. 
There was a deterioration in the level of utilisation in appropriations f()r commitments for 
structural operations in relation to 1996, with an underspend of around ECU 1.5 billion. 
Two points do, however, need to be made. 
First, the appropriations entered in  the budget  fi.1r  1997  included.  in  addition to· the 
initial allocation, the amounts not used in  1994 and 1995.  While it was not possible to 
eliminate the backlog accumulated in  these two years,  the  basic allocation  f(H·  1997 
was used almost in  full. 
Second,  under-utilisation .  in  commitments  essentially  concerned  Community 
initiatives, whereas outturn was satisfactory or at any rate beller than the previous year 
for all the other structural operations. 
2.  The main conclusions 
Since it was renewed in 1992 the financial perspective framework has confirmed its value 
as an instrument of budgetary discipline which can be applied in whatever economic and 
budgetary  context.  The  rules of operation  now seem  well  established  and  accepted. 
Some more specific conclusion~ can nc:-vcrthcless he drawn from this experience. 
o  Margin beneath own resources ceiling too narrow to begin with 
The margin of 0.0 I% of GNP left available fi.1r  contingencies in  the financial  framework 
agreed  at  Edinburgh  proved  inadequate  f(Jr  coping  with  the  uncertainties  of 
macroeconomic developments.  In  the very  first  year that the  new  financial  framework 
4 ·was applied, the margin was used up as a  result of the 'slowdown in.  economic activity. 
and_ the expenditure estimates in the budget c~uld only be covered in  full ·be.causc  ·~ot11er 
revenue" ~as available in addition to own resources.  Had it not been for the- adjustment 
.of t)1e  financial perspective in connection :with enl.argement, the amount of  ~wn  ;esources 
available would have been below the ceiling originally set for  total  appropriations for  · 
payt'nents throughout the entire p·eriod.  -
•  . A  degree  of constraint  not  evenly  applied· between  the  dillcrcni  categories  of 
expenditure 
The.priorities af\d the forecasts of budget requirements by major category of  expenditure 
on  which the  financial  framework- was  original\y  based  can change  over time.  The 
revision procedure provided for in paragraphs  II~  13 of the Agreement would allow· any 
necessary adjustments.to be made, provided the own resources ceiling is.not exceeded 
and due account is taken of the possibilities of reallocating expenditure.  No  use  was 
made of this procedure during the reference period.  It would not have  h~cn rcas'iblc at 
~he start of the period because no margins were available either beneath the ceilings· for. 
the individual  headings or beneath the own resources ceiling.  The proposal which the 
Commission <presented  in  1996  for  redeploying  and  reclassifying  expenditure  in 
' individual headings in order to strengtl)en certain internal policies which could  promote 
· growth ·and employment was not endorsed by the Co  unci I.  · ·  · · 
All in <;1ll,  the degree of eonstrainHmposed by the initial ceilings was uneven as 'between 
the .categories of  expenditure.  ·  ·  · 
By the end of 1992 it was already clear that a margin would probably be available at 
the end of_ the period beneath .the agricultural guideline.  .This has· proved to, be true, 
despite  the  difficulties  dn  the .beef market,  and  each· year ,the  actual  expenditure· 
outt'urn  has ':been ·well  below  the· allocations entered  in  the  btH.Igi:L.  Although· the 
guideline may have  imp~Jsed some constraint in  decisions on agricultural legislation  ... 
this was not really the case 'in terms of budget execution.  Attention has I(H.:used  more 
.on  ways  of  improving  c?(penditurc  forecasts  in  this  ar'ea  and  or.  monitoring 
dcv~lopmcnts when the budget is being implcnicnted. 
\ 
- The allocations lor heading 2 (Structural operations) were .set in  Lcn1u;' of ex,pendilure 
targets  .. They increased significantly over the pefiod (sec '!'able 4).  In1plcmcti.tation of 
the· Structural  Funds  fell  behind  schedule  at  the  start  of the  progra~ming period 
mairily for objectives 2,  Sa ·and 5b and the Community -initiatives.  This shows that· a 
rapid 'rise  in  planned  allocations  can,  initially  at least,  encounter problems of 
· management  and  of installation  of jo~nt  financing  arrangements  which'  do . not 
particularly concern the main beneficiaries.  . 
'The allocations for heading 4  (Ex~ernal action) have the.highcst rate or' increase over· 
·the period (see Table 4).  In this connection it should be  bor.ne  in  mind that there Were  . 
·no  upheavals with  financial  consequences on the international  s~..:em: oh \he scale or 
the events during the earlier period,  and  the  heading 4  alloeali<ins  were arl(mlcd  a 
larg~ measure of protection from  various ~inccrtainties by the  introdt1di~m of  rcs~..:rws 
lilr emergency aid and loan guarantees (sec hclow  ). 
- The  growth  allowed  lor  headings 3  (Internal  policies)  and  5  (Administrative 
. expenditure) was much smaller over the period, and the ceilings imposed much more 
5 of  a constraint.  Evidence ofthis can be seen in the f<wt  that heading J was regularly at 
the  heart of the  budgetary debate between the  institutions even  though  it  represents 
only about 6% oftotal e;xpenditure.  As regards administrative expenditure, given the 
major  building  programmes  undertaken  by  certain  institutions  and  the  growth  in 
expenditure on  pensions, 'the  ceiling set meant that other than  !"or  enlargement staff 
numbers have remained virtually unchanged and sustained elli.)rts  have been made in' 
terms of  redeployment :;tnd rationalisation. 
CD  Relationship  between , appropriations  tor  commitments  and  appropriations  lor 
payments 
' 
In the financial perspective t~e ceiling on appropriations for payments required is set on 
the assumption that the fl1l))imounts available under the ceilings of the various headings 
in appropriations for comm_itinents-will be entered in the budget and actually used.  It is 
also  based  on  payment  schedules  by  category  of expenditure  which  arc  considered 
normal for systems which are fully operational with existing regulations and experience 
acquired.  On the basis of  aptual outturn and development or  outstanding commitments, it 
is  in  fact  possible,  under the  first  subparagraph of paragraph  10  of the  Agreement,  to 
adjust  the  level  of the  ceiling  on  appropriations  lor  payments  if this  is  considered. 
m.:cessary. 
At the start of the  period the increase  in  the  volume of outstanding commitments was 
much stronger than implicitly allowed for in the financial  perspective, mainly because of 
the sluggish progress of implementation of the Structural Funds, whi'ch would eventually 
produce, by a catching-up phenomenon, an increase in payment requirements.  It was not, 
however, felt  necessary to alter the  growth  path  for  the  ceiling on  appropriations  for 
payments, since this appeared high enough to  cover foreseeable needs.  In addition the 
budgetary authority'  when adopting the  1997 and  1998  budgets,  opted  to  place  much 
tighter limits on the growth of  appropriations for payments than on that of appropriations 
for commitments.  -
But  this  policy  could only  go  so  far,  firstly  because  the  utilisation  rate  in  payments 
picked up significantly from  1996 onwards, and secondly, unless there is to he a constant 
slackening  in  the  rate  of clearance of commitments or systematic  underutilisation  of 
commitment appropriations, .the growth in  appropriations  lor payments must inevitably 
catch up with that of  appropriations for commitments. 
•  Re-entry in the budget of  allocations not used lor structural operations 
When the Delors I and II  packages were adopted, the institutions wanted to  underscore 
the  priority  attached  to  strengthening  economic  and  social  cohesion  by  giving  the 
heading 2 allocations in the financial perspective a privileged status.  In  particular they 
decided that unused allocations should be transferred automatically to  subsequent years 
as amounts in excess of  the ceiling. 
Experience has shown that there are  limits and risks  involved  with  the  near automatic 
nature of  these transfers: 
- re-entry of unused appropriations in  budgets for subsequent years is possible only if a 
margin  is  available  beneath  the  own  resources  ceiling.  llowcvcr,  the  size  of this 
6 margin cannot always be calculated  a~curately when the trimsfer .decision has to  be· 
.taken;  · 
_:_  there  is  a  good  case  t(Jr  using  this  mechani~m if the  reason  l(>r  the  underspend  1s 
temporary  diniculties  in  implementing  programmes.  In  the  event  of permmi.ent 
implel!lentation  and  absorption  problems, ·successive  transfers  produce  a  snowball 
effect and provide no incentive to get to the root of  the problems; · 
- trie effe6t  ~f such 'transfers is that the ·sa~e expenditure is  repeatedly entered in  the 
financial perspective and successive budgets until it is implemented.  Thisc~uld give 
a distorted image of actual  budget developments:  When the budget policy  line is  to 
set an overall  limit on the increase in  total· c_xpcnditure  !rom one year to the next, as 
has been :the  cas·e  since 1997, the need to allow for amounts :to  be re-entered- in the 
budget  imposes  further  restrictions  on  the ·possible  growth  of other  categories  of 
expenditure. 
·. o  . Implementation ofthe reserves in heading 6 of  the finimcial pe~spective-
, In  1993  the  institutions  decided  to  set  up  two  new  reserves  alongside  the  monetary 
. reserve- the emergency aid reserve and the loan guarantee reserve·- with~two objective~ 
in  mind:  first  of all  to  avoid too  frequent  application of the  revision  procedure and 
second  to  make  it  possible  to  1i10bilise  quickly  the  resources. n:quired  to  deal  with 
un.f'<;rcseen events  . 
. ~.  Monetary reserve 
For  a  temporary·  period  up  to  the  end  of 1997  this ·reserve  was  given 'the  broader 
assignment_ of  covering the permanent cost of the monetary realig111llents.within the  !~MS 
between  I  September 1992 and 31  October  1994.  But the  reserve  was  not  mobilised 
during  the  period.  In  1995  and  1.996  expenditure  resulting  from.  fluctuations  in  the 
ecu/dollar·parity was financed from the-appropriations available in  heading 1.  . What is 
more,  in  \997  ECU  44 million  in  savings  resulting  from  the -favourable  shift  in  the 
ccu/dollar parity was transferred to the reserve. 
- Reserve for loan guarantees3 
The purpose of this reserve is  to endow the Guarantee Fund and,_should that Fund not 
have sufficient resources, ·to  make additional- direct  payrr1ents~:in the  cvcnLol' J,l  deptor 
defaulting  on  a  loan  guaranteed  by  the  general  · budget.  ;l;his  . Guararitce 
Reserve-Guarantee Fund mechanism performed its,assigned role  pcricctly~ 
It served as  a framework  for the development'  of lendi~g ~perations· gti~ninteed. by  the 
g~neral budget, prompting the CounCil and the EIB to improve the programming of their 
lending to non-member countries  . 
. The resources available to  the mechanism were adequate.  From  \994 to  1997 just over 
· 80% of the reserve's. allocation \Vas  used,  guaranteeing a  total  volume oF  new lending 
The  o-peration  of the  Guarantee  Reserve-Guarantee  Fund  mcchanisn-1  is  analysed  111  detail  in  the  . 
specific report presented by the Commissipn. operations of ECU 7.5 billion.  The Fund's resources have now reachcc..l  the target figure 
set in the regulation of 10% of guaranteed loans outstanding.  The defaults that the Fund 
has had to cover have never resulted in aggregate disbursements in  excess of 5% of the 
amount outstanding. 
The result has been that the allocations under heading 4 of the  financial  perspective for 
expenditure on external action have been shielded from  the unforeseeable impact which 
activation of the guarantee would have had ifthis mechanism had not existed. 
- Reserve for emergency aid 
This reserve  was used,  as· intended, to cover specilic  aic..l  requirements  in  m)n-membcr 
countries,  primarily  f(>r  humanitarian  operations,  in  circumstam.:cs  which,could  not  he 
f(m.:seen  when the budget 'was c..Jrawn  Up,  either as a  result  of"  JH:W  events or of" a  major 
<!_nd  unexpected development in existing situations.  Calls were made on the reserve eacl_t 
.year except  in  1997,  when  ac..lditional  humanitarian  aid  needs  or l·:t'li  120million  in 
appropriations  for  commitments  anc..l  ECU 150 million  in  appropriations  fiJr  payments 
.  were covered by transfers from other items in heading 4.  From  1993 to  1996 the average 
rate of  use of the reserve was just over 75%;  without it there would have had to be some 
very tricky juggling of appropriations in heading 4 during the year or even revisions of 
the ceiling.  However, some of the practical arrangements  for  drawing on the  reserve 
weakened the specific character of  the instrument and herice the reason for its existence. 
·It is  not because the reserve exists that there is no need to make adequate allocation under 
heading 4 for humanitarian aid to cope with average foreseeable requirements each year. 
But it was found that these allocations were constantly underestimated during the period 
and extra resources had to be found during the year by calling on the reserve even though 
it  was  not  always  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  events  in  question  were  entirely 
unforeseen. 
On the other hand the reserve should be mobilised as soon as unfi.>reseen  situations arise,'-
involving large and  urgent requirements,  in  order not to  compromise humanitarian aid 
operations already programmed. 
B.  Improvement of the budgetary procedure 
The new procedures  introduced~ in  the  1993  Agreement have gradually given  life to a 
very encouraging practice of collaboration between the institutions:  Some difficulties, 
connected with the classification of expenditure, were still encountered at the start of the 
period,  as  was  demonstrat~d by  the  dispute  between  the  two  arms of the  budgetary 
authority ·over  the  1995·  b~dget.  The ·objective  set  by  the .  institutions  in  1993  of 
improving imp~ementation ofthe 1982 Joint Declaration was not fully achieved. 
1.  Collahoration hetween the institutions has Kradually Kained suhstance 
The 1993  Agreement introduced an  interinstitutional collaboration  pr<icedun:  involving 
an exchange of view's  on  buc..lget  priorities and conciliation on  compulsory expcnc..liture. 
Although initially this procedure did not live up  to  the high expectations placed in  it,  it 
diu  gradually generate a  conciliation  mentality  which  tended  to  gather momentum and 
continue throughout the buc..lgetary  procec..lure. 
B The  trialogue· meeting  on  budget  prionlles  is  held  bel(lre  the  Commission  takes  its 
decision on. the prcli1ninary draft -budget.  The discussion at this slagc between the  two 
anns of the budgetary authority remained fairly fi.lrmal  to· hegin with, as the Council was 
not always in a position to express its own priorities.  The discussion on the 1998 budget, 
however, demonstrated that this  procedure could produce satisfactory  results if it  was 
launched,  upstream,  by  an  informal·  trialogue  · meeting  coming  just  after  the . 
Commission's internal discussion.on budget priorities and provided the institutions were· 
prepared ·to  continue discussion  in  the  subsequent stages  of the  budgetary  procedure, 
dealing impartially with the entire budget.  In· this  way  it  was_ possible to come to  an 
agreement for  1998  on  the  principle  and  detailed  arrangements  of a  strict  budgetary 
policy cove.ring all items/ofexpenditure.  -
After the first application of the procedure ended in a dispute  in·  1994, conciliation on 
compulsory expenditure has also gradually produced satisfaCtory  results.- The two arms 
· , of  the budgetary. authority were able to agree on the amounts to he entered in.the 1  (A( i( iF 
Guarantee items of the  budget in  which  Parliament had  s_.peeial  interest.  which  made  it 
possible  to ·overcome,  without  ne'cessarily  settling,  the  differences  of opinion  abo~1t 
classification  of  expenditure.  further  advances  were  made  with  the  conciliation 
procedure  as .a  result  of the  compromise  reached  hy  the  institutions  at  the trialogue 
ineeting  on  8 April 1997  on  the  possibility  of presenting  a  letter  t1t'  amendment  in 
OCtober,  after the  normal deadline,  to  adjust the  forecasts  of agricultural  expenditure. 
The institutions held  a  trialogue meeting· at the end of November 1997  to  discuss the 
ad-hoc letter of amendment on the EAGGF Guarantee Section. 
1,\ further spin-off from conciliation in the budgetary procedure for 1997 was the adoption· 
of the  ]_oint  Declaration  of  12  Decembe~  1996  on  improving  information  for  the 
budgetary authority on fisheries agreements. 
Even  though the  1993  Interinstitutional Agreement restricts conciliation to  compulsory . 
.  ~xpenditure alone, it has by  and large been extended in  practice. to  the entire hudget and 
;.has  continued to  he applied by '!he institutions beyond the Coui1eil's lirsl reading.  F.vcn. 
though  these-good _results  were confirmed  with  the  estahlishment of ~he  i'99X  budge!, 
they arc still fragile and wi.ll  have to be.consolidated i1\ the budgetary proccdme t'or 1999. 
2.  Continuing prohlem of'the classificulion o{expendilure 
This ·issue is  still unresolved for the headings on which no compromise was reached in·. 
the Agreement (headings 2 and 3),  i.~. essentially heading I. 
The  new  conciliation  procedure  on  compulsory  expenditure  was _initially  used  by 
Parliament as an opportunity not only to discuss the amounts involved (which is what the · 
Council  and  the  Commission  con.sidered  was  the  purpose)  hut  also  to  argue  about 
classification.  After Parliam(!nt  had _unilaterally  Classified  certain  EACIGF  Guarantee 
items as non-compulsory expenditure in the  1995 budget; the  ~ouncit  hrought an action 
· before the Court of Justice which annl.!lled the budget.  Since then the institutions have 
not really got down to  discussing classification of all  items of expenditure, despite the 
undertaking given when agrccm~nt was reached on the 1995 hudgeL  · 
9 3.  Improvement of  the application of  the 1982 Joint Declaration:  results still 
incomplete 
The Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982, which is one of the fundamental  instruments for 
Community  public  finances,  sets  the  stage  for  balanced  interinstitutional  relations 
between  the  two  arms  or the  budgetary  authority  and  also  hclw~..:en  the  legislative 
authority and the budgetary authority.  This includes the undertaking by  the Council not 
to enter maximum amounts in basic instruments and in  return  Parliam~..:nt's acceptance of 
the need for a proper legal basis before appropriations entered in  the budget can he used. 
The need for a legal basis was restated in  the 1998 Interinstitutional  Agr~.:ement and then 
again in the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement.  What is  more a stalL'mcnt annexed to the 
1993  Agreement  ·Confirmed  the  validity  of  the  principles  set  out  in  the  1982 
Joint Declaration concerning legal  bases and maximum amounts and pledged action by 
the institutions to improve application of  these principles. 
On  6  July  1994  the  Commission  accordingly  sent  to  the  budgetary  authority  a 
communication covering the two issues of "amounts deemed necessary" and legal bases. 
'(a)  Entry of financial provisions in legislative instruments 
On 6 March I 995 Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a joint d~..:claration 
in  which they rejected the practice or "amounts deemed  nec~..:ssary" and made allowance 
li.>r  the  new  legal  situation  resulting  from  the  introduction,  in  certain  areas,  of the 
legislative codecision procedure.  This joint declaration provides that: 
•  multiannual  programmes  adopted  under  the  codecision  procedure  will  include 
reference amounts which arc binding on the institutions during the annual  budgetary 
procedure: 
• · multiannual  programmes  based  on  instruments  not  covered  by  the  codecision 
procedure will  not include such amounts.  Should the Council  still  wish to enter a 
financial reference in such an instrument, it will be taken as illustrative of the will of 
the  legislative  authority .. The  financial  reference  is  not,  therefore,  binding on tlie 
institutions during the budgetary procedure. 
In  practice, however, the Council has systematically entered financial  relcrences in  the 
instruments it has adopted. 
(b)  The issue oflegal bases 
Article 22 of the Financial Regulation, taking up the wording of Title IV, paragraph 3 (c) 
of the 1982 Joint Declaration, lays down the principle that appropriations entered in the 
budget for any significant Community action may not be  t,~sed  until  a  basic instrument 
has  first  been  adopted.  The  interpretation of this  hard-won  ~ompromise between  the 
institutions involved in  the budgetary debate has given  rise to  disputes and  the  budget 
even today still  has many items without a  legal  basis which cannot always be  clearly 
j usti tied. 
This  has  prompted the  institutions to  try  to  negotiate,  on  the  basis  or a  Commission 
proposal,  new rules and procedures in  a  bid  to  improve interinstitutional  collaboration 
10 ·and sound  financial  management.  These negotiations an; currently on  hold because of 
the cases brought before the Court of  Justice. Agreement needs to be found as a matter of 
urgency, otherwise it will not be possible to implement the budget properly. 
4.  Use of  budget re$erves 
· Article 19 of the Financial Regulation provides that the budget ~ay  include "provisional 
appropriations" and "contingency reserves".  The Commission's. view is that the purpose 
of such reserves  should .be  to  facilitate budget management by makiDgit po.ssible  to 
allocate appropriations to  a budget heading during the ·year for ·an  operation which had 
not been fully  finalised when the budget wa~ ~oted~ in  particular where. the  legal  basis 
had still not been adopted.  In  recent years Parliament has tended to mak~  more and tllOre 
usc of this instrument, making the  re\casc of.  the appropriations subject to  all  kinds of 
conditions, often very remote from  the eurpose of the budgetary heading concerned.  lts 
interpretation of the use which could be made of the  budgetary reserve has been  very. 
broad and debatable on certain points. 
~· 
While the appropriations. for  a given  year are authorised  by  what.olight to  be ·a  single· 
budgetary act,  this widespread use of reserves  results  in  authorisation being given on 
various occasions during the year.  The mobilisation of the appropriations  entered ·in 
· reserve also':lallows the budgetary authority to  interfe~e in budget execution even though 
this  is  a  matter  exClusively  for  the  Commission.  Finally,  although  budget 
implementation- is  subject  to  ex  post" control,  Parliament's  practice  means  that  it  is 
de facto  subject to  ex ante  co~trol, in  that  the  Commission  may  have  to· state  how  it 
intends to use appropriations before they can be transferred to. the operatiOJial headings. 
There  is  therefore  a  good  case  lor  clarifying  in  the  F.inancial  Regulation  tile  rules 
governing the usc of  budget reser-Ves 
· II.  GUIDELINES FOR A NEW AGREEMENT 
As  the·Interinstitutional" Agreement  has  on  the  whole  worked  satisfactorily,  there  1s 
therefore no need for far-reaching changes to the existing rule~. 
•  '  '  I 
On the other hand there have in recent years been many deClarations and interinstitutional 
agreements on budget matters, and this has rather blurred the legal situation in this area. 
Because of this complexity  and  of the  existence  in  certain  instruments of provisions 
which  no  longer  have  any  raison  d'etre  given  past  experience  or  new  rules,·  the 
Commission believes that the renewal of  the Interinstitutional Agreement should be taken 
as an opportunity tQ  update and coordinate all the interinstitutional agreements andjoint 
·declarations on budgetary matters.  · 
.  . 
The Commission's proposal is that various points should be added or clarified to make a 
clear distinction between the two  purposes of the  Interinstitutional Agreement, namely 
impl.ementation of  the financial perspective and i111provement of  the budg~tary procedure. 
- . 
11 A.  Management of  the financial framework 
Thl:  proposals concerning the structure, content and amount or thl:  various headings in 
thl:  linancial  framework  arc  contained  in  the  communication  on  thl:  rl:ncwal  of thl: 
financial  perspective.  This communication deals only  with  the  provisions governing 
application of  the financial framework. 
These provisions remain valid for the same length of time as the  financial  perspective, 
and this could be stipulated in the Agreement. 
On the question of changes to· be made,  the Commission believes that mai'ntaining the 
own  resources  ceiling  at  1.27%  of GNP,  as  proposed  in  the  communication  on  the 
renewal of the financial perspective, must be offset by more flexible management of the 
financial  framework,  in  particular  to  make  it  possible  to  contend  with  unforeseen 
requirements. 
I.  Relent  ion of  existing provisions 
Su~ject to certain darilications or possihll: n.:dralling, the ( 'ommission is  pt:oposing that 
the principle and procedures for the following provisions be kept unchanged: 
0 
- the  concept of ceiling  applicable  to  the  various  headings  and,  l(lr  heading 1,  the 
principle of the agricultural guideline for which the method of calculation and scope 
are set out in the Decision on budgetary discipline; 
the  establishment  of these  ceilings  in  constant  prices  and  the  annual  technical 
adjustment in line with inflation and GNP growth; 
acceptance of the maximum rate of increase deriving from  budgets established within 
the limit of the financial perspective;  ' 
-- the undertaking by the two arms of the hudgctary authority to  leave, as a rule, margins 
available beneath the ceiling~.ofthe linancial perspedivc; 
}! 
-- the possibility or an adjust~ent in  line with the conditions or implementation in order 
to ensure an orderly progression between commitments and paytm:nts; 
the possibility of revising the financial perspective by the m~jority required tor budget 
decisions; 
the procedures in force for the mobilisation of  the reserves. 
2.  Provisions concerning certain categories ofexpenditure 
(a)  Heading 2 
The relatively privileged status of the allocations lor heading 2 is maintained in  the rules 
governing  the  Structural  Funds  and  the  Cohesion  Fund,  the  new  I  ntcrinstitutional 
Agreement  should  again  contain  an  undertaking  hy  the  two  arms  or the  budgetary 
authority to comply with the allocu!ion" prnvidcd  l(>r  in  the  linancial  p(.!rspective  l(>r  the 
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (paragraph 21  or the 1991 i\gr(.!cmcnt). 
12 Two  of the  amendments  proposed  in  the  new· Structural  Funds  regulations . should, 
however, be reflected in the new Agreement. 
TQe  first  concerns the conditions of implementation of the Structural ·Funds.  Each year 
the  budget  commitments  would  correspond  to  the  annual· programming  instalments. 
Amounts committed but not  paid  in  the  two  years  following  their entry  in  the  budget 
would be automatically cancelled and a decision on whether to  make the appropr_ iations 
available again would be governed by  the existing provi~ions of the l,.inancial  Regulation. 
This riew approach to the management of the Structural Funds would mean that it sho11ld 
no  longer be  necessary to  arrange for  the~ transfer to. subsequent years of amounts  not 
used  in- a  given  year,  which  would  involve  raising  the  ceiling  of  the  corresponding 
heading of  the financial perspective.  However, should there be delays at the. start of the 
period in preparing the programming, such a transfer WC?uld  be authorised for allocations 
not used during the first year covered by the financial perspective. 
The second amendment concerns the index-linking of the allocations  !'or  the Structural 
Funds.  To facilitate--the programming ·of Structural  Fund openitions, the deflators to he . 
used  lor adjusting, prior to entry in the  budget,  the  annual  a\l(xations originally set .in 
constant  prices  should  be  set  in  advance  in  the  new  rules.  The  Interinstitutional 
Agreement  should  therefore  provide  that  fi.lr  the  "Stru~tural  Funds"  subheading -the 
annual  tcchriical  adjustment would  be  based on  the same dellators.  There could  be  a 
mid-term review of the index base in the light of. actual inflation but without any ex post 
adjustment of  allocations for earlier years.  .  '  · 
(b)  Heading 6 
- Monetary reserve 
The usefulness of this reserve was not confirmed during the  period  1993-99.  What is 
more,  fluctuations  in  the  dollar  rate  should  have  le~s. influence  on · agricultural 
expenditure iD  future as a result of the proposed reform of the CAP and assuming that it 
will be agreed to adjust the euro/dollar parity in  the letter or amendment presented in  the 
autumn.  For  this  rea~on it  is  planned  to  gradually  eliminate  the  alloc<itions  l<x  this 
reserve ·as  proposed in  the communication on the  renewal  of the  linanciai (x!rspectivc. · 
During  this  period  the  provisions  of the  I  nterlnstitutional. Agreement  govct"nmg  the 
operatia'n ofthj? reserve would continue to apply.  .  . 
- Reserve for loan guarantees  ·. 
As the Guarantee Reserve - Guarantee Fund mechanism has served its assigned purpose, 
it  is  proposed  that  the  operating  rules  currently  contained  in  .the  Interinstitutional 
Agreement for this reserve be kept unchanged. 
The· new parameters proposed in  the report on  the operation of this  mechanism would 
nevertheless result in a reduction in the allocation for the loan guarantee reserve provided 
thai this did not add any further constraint on lending capacity. 
- Reserve for emergency aid 
)n order to restore the emergency aid reserve to its getJuine  fu~ction, which  is  to pn)vide 
· -- -a rapid response to specitic and untoreseeablc needs, three amendments are proposed. 
13 Provided that the corresponding operational headings are allocated sufticient resources to 
cover average requirements each year, the first step could be to clarify the criterion for 
mobilising the reserve.  In future the reser-Ve should not be called on to cover needs which 
exceed  what was expected in  existing situations.  Only needs arising out of genuinely 
new and unforeseeable events would be covered by the reserve. 
Secondly, it is proposed that it be stipulated that the reserve must he drawn on when such 
a requirement is  identified, even if amounts are still available in  the relevant operational 
items  under  heading 4  of the  financial  perspective,  provided  that  the  ·programmed 
spending indicates that the amounts will be used in full. 
Finally the reserve should be mobilised only lor significant amounts.  The Commission is 
therefore  proposing  that  the  text  of the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  should  leave  a 
neutral margin of  at least EUR 15 million to be covered by  rcc..Jcploymcnl. 
1!1  this way it would be possible to reduce the allocation lor thc'Tcscrvc as proposed in the 
communication on the renewal of  the financial perspective. 
3.  lncreased.flexihility in managemenl olfhe.financialframework 
The procedure  for  revising the  financial  perspective, the arrangements  li.lr  which arc .to 
remain  unchanged,  must be reserved  for  relatively  large  and  lasting  alterations  to  the 
financial  framework  and  must  be  applied  ahead  of the  preparation  of the  budgets 
concerned.  For more specific requirements arising while the budget is  being drawn up or 
implemented  in  a  financial  framework  which  in  future  will  offer  less  latitude,  it  is 
proposed that the new Agreement offer additional but limited margins of flexibility. 
(a)  Between certain headings of  the financial perspective 
The p()ssibility would be provided of transferring, for  a given year, allocations between 
certain headings of the financial  perspective by  means of a more flexible proeec..Jurc  than 
that of revision. 
In the light ofexperience and following the same reasoning that was used  for  setting the 
various expenditure ceilings, this possibility would be  restricted  to  headings 3 (Internal 
policies) and 4 (External action).  Heading I continues to he governed by the agricultural 
guideline, the principle of which is  laid down  in  the  Decision on  budgetary discipline. 
The allocations for heading 2 have privileged status.  Administrative expenditure under 
heading 5  cannot  really  be  considered  interchangeable  with  operational  expenditure. 
Finally, heading 6 covers reserves specifically intended to enable the  Union to  contend 
with unforeseen expenditure without jeopardising the financing of  current policies. 
To ensure that the financial perspective continues to act as an expenditure framework, the 
possibility of transferring allocations between the two headings would  be  restricted as 
follows: 
- the transferable amount would be  su~jcct to a ceiling, set as an  absolute amount oC 
say, EUR I 00 million; 
14 a  margin  would  at all  events  have  to  remain  available  beneath the  ceiling  6f the  · 
original heading.  This·mearl's that the margin beneath the original heading would have 
to he say liUR foo million more than-the transicr. made;  ·  · 
- the.  f~cility could not he used for the same reasons, i.e.  to provide adJiti(mai· resources 
for the same budget items, the following year. . 
The transfer would be possible during the annual budgetary procedure (or the procedure 
concerning a supplementary  and amending budget),  without Torma!  adjustment of the 
ceilings concerned.  The Commission, however, would not be ·allowed to make use of  the 
possibility when presenting its preliminary draft.  There would be conciliation betWeen. 
the two arms of the budgetary authority' in accordance ,with the arrangements laid down, 
· before this transfer mechanism could be applied.· 
(b)  = From one year to the next 
Underutilisation of appropriations for payments in  the outturn for  a given year gives rise 
to positive bal<inces which are entered in the budget for the following year hy means of a 
supplcment:.iry and amending budget and arc deducted from- the amount or  own resources 
<;alkd in  li1r that year.  An estimate ol"the balance can·als<; be  e1~tcn:d in  the dmlt budget 
Juring the budgetary procedure, hy  m~:ans or  a letter of' amendment.  . 
The Commission is  proposing that the  new Agreement should  provide  !(Jr  part of any 
positive budget balance from  the previous· year to be  used  to  cover signi !icant political 
. requirements agreed in advance. It could be agreed that the budgetary authority would be 
allowed to vote expenditure - in appropriations for commitments and outside the financial 
perspective  ceilings  - for  a  maximum  of say  EUR 500 million,  provided  that these 
. appropriations were  covered by  corresponding  underutilisation  in  the  previous  b)Jdget 
.  and that the positive balance from the previous year was at least equal to this amount 
The two arms of the budgetary authority would have to  reach explicit agreement o~ the. 
use of  this possibility and on the corresponding amount within the limit set. 
· 4.  Duration olthefinancial perspective 
(a)'  ·  An adjustment clause for the fin~ncial perspective 
The new financial framework for 2000-2006 comes at a point in time when it will  h~we to 
1inance  both  the  development  of  Community  pol ides  and·  the  requirements  of 
enlargement to include new Member States. 
The  financial  framework  which  will  be  adopted  for  a  lillccil-member _Union  with 
amounts  being  left  available  for  an  initial. enlargement will  have· to  be  adjusted,  by 
agreement between the two  arms of the  budgetary  authority,  when  the  new  niembers 
actually  arrive.  This  will  mean  restoring  to  the  various  headings  of the  financial 
perspective all or part of the. amounts left avaiH1ble and if  these are not sufficient to meet 
the needs of enlargement, to revise the financial perspective without exceeding the own 
resources ceiling.  A clause providing for this should be included in the new Agreement. 
15 (b)  Extension ofthe financial perspective 
The  rule  governing  the  extension  of  the  tinancial  perspective,  as  contained  111 
paragraph 25 of  the current Agreement, could be clarified and simplified. 
It should first be confirmed that unles~ one ofthe parties expressly refuses any extension, 
the agreement will continue to be extended year by  year until  the  entry  into  force  of a 
new financial .perspective. 
As the current Agreement provides that the ceilings will  he  adjusted on the  basis or the 
average increase 9bserved over the preceding period, it does not guarantee compatibility 
between expenditure and the own resources ceiling. 
In  order to be consistent with the general philosophy of the ·financial  perspective, there 
should be a link in the extension clause with-the past growth ofexpcnditure and also with 
the own resources availal:Jle.  The Commission is therefore proposing that in  the event of 
the  financial  perspective  being  extended,  the  ceilings  in  force  will  he  raised  by  the 
average .annual rate of increase over the period 2000-2006 with the  rate  of increas€ of 
each of  the headings being restr:icted to the increase in GNP. 
U.  Budgetary procedure and interinstitutional collaboration 
The Commission is proposing that all the provisions in  this area he consolidated, subject 
to  appropriate  adjustments - ·or  additions  in  particular  in  the  procedures  for 
interinstitutional-collaboration. 
As  the  provisions  concerned arc  not  directly  'linked  to -the  existence  of a  Jina1acial 
framework,  they  must )be  of  .a permanent nature.  'Vhis  means that the  lcg<il  instrument 
constituted  by  the 'Interinstitutional  Agreement should 'he  concluded  li.lr  an  indef~nite 
period even if: 
allowance  should  be  made for  tbe possibility -of adding further  provisions if new 
agreements -were to -be ·reached between the institutions on specific points; 
the provisions relating to the management of the financial  framework would cease to 
apply if  no .such financial framework existed. 
I.  ·  The new provisions and the:c:han}.{es to  he made JoJhe existing agreement 
(a)  Classification ofexpenditure 
The  1982  Joint  Declaration,  which  addresses  the  compulsory  - non-conwulsory  issue 
from the angle of classification criter-ia and classification procedure, has not produced .a 
satisfactory solution.  -
It  would appear .that any attempt to  define new objective criteria,  compatible with  the 
Treaty,  for  distinguishing  between· the  two  types  of expenditure  and  providing  an 
unassailable classification is doomed to failure. 
The Commission therefore believes that the institutions should agree on the classification . 
of expenditure in the Interinstitutional Agreement.  The Commission proposes that runil 
development  measures  and all  other expenditure  financed  by  the  EAGGF  Guarantee 
16 Section  which  is not  linked  to.  common  marke( organisations  (veterinary  measures, 
pro"motion schemes) should be inCluded in the category of'  non-cmi~pulsory expenditure. 
The  same would also ·apply  to  headings 2  and  3  expenditure·,  as .agreed  in, the  1993 
Agreement.  ·Under·  heading 4  the  Commission  proposes  that 'the  Community's 
· · contribution  to  the· EBRD capital  and  to ·fisheries  agreements  (  othe~;.  than  those  to 
international organisations) should be considered compulsory expenditure.  For heading 5 
the classification would be that of  the present budget. 
·.  .  I  •  •  •  • 
The Commission is proposing that the Classitication of  new budget items be agreed under 
. a  conciliation  procedure extended  to  the  entire  budget.  .In  th~ ahsence  of agreement 
betw~en the two arms of the budgetary authority on tl1e classification oF expenditure, the· 
Commission's proposed classitica,tion  in  its  preliminary draft budget would  he  deemed 
approved (cf.  negative codc_cision  procedure which  already  ap)1lics·  l(>r  m<'>nilisaiion  or-
· ·reserves). 
(b)  Interplay between legislative pow:rs and budgetary powers 
t~  Entry of  financial provisions in legislative instruments· 
The Treaty· of Amsterdam extends the scope of legislative codecision; to  include areas 
where  financial  aspects  are  substantial.  This  procedure  now  concerns  th~ follo.wing 
areas:4 ·-
non-·discrimination on the grounds of  nationality (Article 6) 
lrcc movement of lJnion citizens (Article Xa) 
-- Cree  movement (lf workers, including-social security  IC.lr .migrant workers· (Articl~s  '49 · 
and 51) 
-- . right· of establishment,· including  coordination of spccitil ·provisions  on ,grounds of 
publicpolicy, public security or public health (Articles 54 and 56) 
:::- access to activities as· self-employed persons and  in  particular mutual  recognition ·of 
.  .  I 
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of  formal qualifications(Article 57) , · 
· services (Article 66) 
transport (~rticles 75 and 84) 
- harmonisation of national··legislation  for  the  :cstahlishme1~t and  lunctio'nin:g  of the 
· single market (Article 1  OOa) 
incentive measures in the field of  employment (Article l.09r).  • 
·- customs cooperation (Article 116) 
social pol icy (Article 11 X) 
4  The Treaty articles mentioned correspond to the old numbering which is still in  l'orcc. 
17 equal opportunities and pay for men and women (Article 119) 
- implementing decisions relating to the European Social Fund (Article 125) 
- _  education, vocational tr~·ining and youth (Articles 126 and 127) 
- culture (Article 128) 
public health (Article 129):· 
- consumer protection (Nrtiflc 129a) 
- .trans-European networks;(!Article I 29d) 
'  .•. , 
- implementing  decisions -:"relating  to  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(Article 130e)  ,.,, 
research and technologiC~t  development (Articles 130i and 130o) 
',.,.,,(.;,,  -
- environment (Article  lJb~;) 
..  ~ -~ 
- development cooperati~}t(Article 130w) 
. '·'·  \" ~  . 
- fight against fraud (Article_ 209a) 
- statistics (Article 213c.r)  · ··_ 
- establishment of an independent supervisory body fi.>r  the protection of personal data 
(Article 213b  ). 
This extension ofthe use of-the codecision procedure, combined with the provisions of 
the Joint Declaration of 6  March 1995, may severely hamstring the budgetary authority, 
even· though  it  should  be  allowed  a  certain  amount  of discretion  tor  reasons  of 
institutional balan_ce and budgetary policy.  The Commission, accordingly takes the view 
that the content of the· Joint  Declaration  should be reviewed  in  the  light of the  new 
situation created by the Treaty ofAmsterdam. 
The principle set out in  the Joint Declaration of 6 March 1995, whereby the institutim:ts 
undertake to_ comply during the budgetary procc:dure with the  reference amounts set in 
the  legislative codecision procedure, can be retained.  However,  the  two  arms or" the 
budgetary authority should 'be given the possibility of agreeing during the conciliation 
procedure to depart from these amounts.5  If the Council and Parliament fail  to agree on 
an  amount other than  that ·set by  the  legislative  authority,  the  arm  or  the  budgetary 
authority  which  has the  l~st say  would  be allowed  to  depart. by  tip  to  I()<)~(,  rrom  the 
reference amount. 
5  This margin of manoeuvre would not,  however, apply to  Social  Fund and  ERDF expenditure, give·n 
their privileged status, nor to researchcxpen01ture, since the Treaty states that the allocations set in  the 
framework programme constitute a maximum amount. 
18 •  . Legal bases 
The' new Agreement could.state what is offered in return for recognition of the principle · 
·that appropriations earmarked for a Community .operation .cannot be used until a  legal 
basis exists:  .  ·  ·  .  .  ·  · 
- items with an :~llocation of less than a  certain amount, subject  to the  principle of 
budget specification, 
preparatory  action  and  pilot projects,  with. an  indication,. of how  long  they. may 
• continue without a legal basis, 
- autonomous operations, i.e: generic action  l()r_ which  the Treaty alone coi1stitutes an· 
adequate legal basis. 
2.  Consolidalil~n  (~f'the existing provi.\·ions 
(a).  Application of the maximum rate_ or increase 
· The issues relating to  the application of the weighted average rate arc addressed  in  the 
· Joint  DeClaration  of 30  June  1982.  The. agreement  states  iti  particula~ to  what  the 
· -niaximum  tate  of increase  applies,  the circumstances  in  which  the  ~wo arms  of the 
budgetary authority can agree to set a new maximum r_ate .and  Parlian1cnt's margin of 
manoeuvre. ' 
'  ~ 
The  Commission :proposes  that  these  provisions  be  kept . .unchanged.  iri  the  new 
Interinstitutional  Agreement,  since  they  are  only  really  relevant  if  the  financial 
. perspective is not applied. 
(b)  .  Late presentation of  a letter of  amendment for agriculture 
The'Commission_ is proposing that the new Interinstitutional Agreement should formalise 
the co"nsensus reached that such-a letter of  amendment should be given on~y onereading  .. 
The sc(lpc of  the letter or  amendment could be extended to cover e,xpcnditure on_iisheries . 
agrcernents  ..  It  should  he  the  opportuility  .to  adjust th~ d_istribution  hetwccn an1ounts. 
entered ·against the heading and those contained.·in .reserve in the pre I  iminary dran budget 
on the b'asis of the agreemt;nts ~hich will  be  in  Ioree on  I  ,January  ()r the bttdget year· in 
.  . 
question. 
(c)  ·coordination of  the most recent agreements. 
•  ·Joint Declaration ·of 12 December 1996 on improving  ~nformation. to  the budgetary 
·au~hority on fisheri.es agreements  ·  .  , 
The purpose of this declaration was to  gn~rantee Parliament -~etter information about the 
budgetary implications of agreements being negotiated  .. It also.states that Parliament and 
-the Council will endeavour to agree on the amount of approprif1tions invoivcd dur.ing ·the · 
ad hoc conciliation procedure on compulsory ~xpcnditure provided  li1r  in  Annex II  or the 
1993 Interinstitutional Agreement.  .  ·  -
19 The  institutions  have  not  seen  eye-to-eye  on  the  distribution  or appropriations  to  be 
entered  under  the  operational  heading  and  those  to  be  held  in  reserve,  and  also  on 
whether authorisation should be given to implement an agreement provisionally without 
waiting until Parliament has delivered its opinion.  These points sh.ould be clarified when 
the new Interinstitutional Agreement is negotiated. 
On  the  first  point  it  should  be  stated  that  the  operational  heading  will  carry  all 
appropriations corresponding to  fisheries agreements which  arc  certain  to  enter into 
force during the year. 
- On the second  p()int,  a sufficient lapse of time - 6  months say  - should  be  allowed 
between Parliament being informed about the terms and  lin;mcial  implications of the 
agreement  and  the  corresponding  appropriations  actually  being  used,  so  that 
Parliament can deliver its 'opinion in  advance.  Arter the 6 months the appropri(.ltions 
could be used. 
•  The  Interinstitutional  Agreement of 17 July 1997  on  the  financing  of the  cohmwn 
foreign and security policy 
This  Interinstitutional Agreement, which was negotiated in  parallel  with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, is  designed to  prevent potential conflicts between the political decision to 
initiate a joint action and the financing of such action which is a matter for Parliament to 
decide  since  the  expenditure  is  non-compulsory.  The  institutions  agreed  to  step  up 
budgetary conciliation, by trying to secure agreement on the amounts to he entered in  the 
budget, and the exchange of information on the content of  the joint action. 
3.  RnlurRed scope.fiJr the conciliution procedure 
The Commission believes that the broader scope now given to the conciliation procedure, 
which has developed into a key instrument in  the budgetary procedure, should be written 
into the Interinstitutional "Agreement. 
This conciliation should be extended to the entire budget, i.e.  including non-compulsory 
expenditure.  In  view of the other proposals made in this report, a number of additional 
questions should be addressed by the conciliation procedure. 
The first concerns the classification of  expenditure. 
The second concerns application of the proposed flexibility between headings 3 and"4 
of the financial perspective.  At the conciliation stage the two arms of the budgetary 
authority should consider whether any "transfers" envisaged by  one or other arm of 
the budgetary authority should in fact be made and what the amount should be. 
Thirdly, the institutions should use the conciliation procedure to secure agreement on 
the amounts to  be entered in  the  budget tor fisheries  agreements and  the CFSP, as 
provided  in  the  Joint  Declaration  of 12  December  1996  and· the  i  ntcrinstitutional 
agreement of 17 July I 997. 
- If necessary the institutions could also agree, under this procedure, to  depart  from  the 
reference  amounts  set  by  the  legislative  authority, ·in  <iccordance  with  the  Joint 
Declaration of  6 Marth 1995, lor multiannual programmes adorted by codet:ision. 
20 This conciliation  stag~ would, as at present, come bcl{>re  the Council's lirst reading .  .It 
would resume after the-two arms of the budgetary authority had each given the budget its 
first reading  .. This second ·stagewouldbe held afthe same time as the Council's second 
reading,- which  would  allow  the  institutions  to  discuss  the  lett~r or amendment for 
agricuitureto be present~d in October. 
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Financial framework actually applied from 1993 to 1999 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMITMENTS 
ECU MILLION 
Current ·prices 
1993  1994  1995  1996  -1997 
1. COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY  36657  36465  37944  40828  41805 
2. STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS  - 22192  23176  26329  29131  31477 
Structural Funds  20627  21323  24069  26579  28620 
Cohesion Fund  1565  1853  2152  2444  2749 
EEA financial mechanism  0  0  108  108  108 
3. INTERNAL POLICIES  4109  4370  5060  5337  -5603 
4. EXTERNAL ACTION  4120  4311  4895  5264  5622 
5. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  - 3421  3634  4022  4191  .4352 
6. RESERVES 
-~ 
~ - 1522  1530  1146  1152  1158 
Monetary reserve  1000  1000  5QO  500  500 
Guarantee reserve  313  318  323  326  329 
Emergency aid reserve 
,.c  209  212  323  32.6"  329 
~ 
7. COMPENSATION  \_  0  0  1547  701  212 
8. TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMITMENTS  . 72021  73486  80943- 86604  90229 
9. TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR PA:VMENTS  68611  70352  77229  82223  85807 
Appropriations for payments as % of GNP  1,20  1,20  1,20  1,20  1,22 
MARGIN (% of GNP)  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,02  0,02 


















1,26  - .  - .  . .  { ) Prov1s1onal amounts forheadmg 2 (proposal by the Commiss1on for the adJustment to take account ofthe cond1bons of  1mplementat•on) 
IMPACT OF REVISIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS IN LINE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
199:i  _..-- 1994  1995  "1996  1997  1998 
Revision (October 1993) 
Heading 3:  stimulation of economic activity (commitments)  45 
Heading 4:  Middle-East peace process (commitments)  75 
Head1ng 5:  depreciation  _of_ ecu against BEF  (commitmer~ts)  55 
Overall ceiling - appropriations for <;ommitments  175 
Ceiling - appropriations for payments  120 
Adjustment in line with conditions of implementation (Apri11995) 
Heading 2:  Transfer"for Structural Funds (commitments)  869  869 
Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments  869- 869 
Ceiling - appropriations for payments  - 935  696  434 
Adjustment in line with conditions of  implementation (Apri11996) 
Heading 2  Transfer for Structural-Funds (commitments)  380  1000 
Headmg 2: Transfer for Cohesion Fund (commitments)  11"- -
Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments  - 391  1000 
Ceiling - appropriations for payments  186  633 
Adjustment In line with conditions of Implementation (Apri11997) _ 
Heading 2:  Transfer for Structural Funds (commitments)  -500-
Heading 2:  Transfer for Cohesion Fund (commitments) 
Overall-ceiling -appropriations for commitments 





























Comparison between financial perspective,  budget and outturn, from  1993 to  1998 
ECU million 
I 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  .. 
' 
OV""OVO OCI 
FP  Budget  Outturn  FP  Budget  Outturn  FP  Budget  Outturn  FP  Budget  Outturn  FP  Budget  I 
Appropriations for commitments 
1. Common agricultural policy  36.657  35.352  35.032  36.465  34.787  32.970  37.944  36.894  34.503  40.828  40.828  39.360  41.805  40.805  40.423 
2. Structural operations  22.192  22.192  22.178  23.176  23.176  21.430  26.329  26.329  24.243  29.131  29.131  28.614  31.477  31.477  30.078 
Structural Funds  20.627  20.627  20.614  21.323  21.323  19.577  24.069  24069  22001  26.579  26.579  26.083  28.620  28.620  27.226 
Cohesion Fund  1.565  1.565  1.565  1.853  1.853  1.853  2.152  2.152  2.152  2.444  2.444  2.444  2.749  2.749  2.749 
EEA financial mechanism  108  108  90  108  108  87  108  .  108  103 
3. Internal policies  4.109  4.108  4.066  4.370  4.365  4.339  5.060  5.055  5.018  5.337  5.321  5.219  5.603  5:601  5.519 
4. External action (  1)  4.120  4.115  4.294  4.311  4.297  4.483  4.895  4.873  5.061  5.264  5.264  5.524  5.622  5.601  5.476 
5. Administrative expenditure  3.421  3.417  3.365  3.634  3.634  3.581  4.022  3.999  3.924  4.191  4.184  4.121  4.352  4.284  4.209 
6. Reserves  1.522  1.224  14  1.530  1.530  294  1.146  1.146  251  1.152  1.152  235  1.158  1.158  286 
Monetary reserve  1.000  1.000  0  1.000  1.000  0  500  500  0  500  500  0  500  500  0 
Loan guarantee reserve  313  15  14  318  318  294  323  323  251  326  326  235  329  329  286 
Emergency aid reserve  209  209  0  212  212  0  323  323  0  326  326  0  329  329  0 
7. Compensation  1.547  1.547  1.547  701  701  701  212  212  212 
Total approps. for commitments  72 021  70.408  68.949  73.486  71.789  67.098  80.943  79.843  74.546  86.604  86.580  83.773  90.229  89.137  86.203 
Total appropriations for payments  68.611  66.858  64.783  70.352  68.355  59.273  77.229  75.438  66.547  82.223  81.943  77.089  85.807  82.366  79.342 
(1) The outturn figures include the transfer of ECU 209million from the emergency aid reserve in  1993. ECU 212 million in 1994. ECU 235.5 million in  1995 and ECU  326 million 
in  1996. 
~ 
1998 
FP  Budget  Outturn 
43.263  40.437 
33.461  33.461 
30.482  30.482 
2.871  2.871 
108  108 
6.003  5.756 
6.201  5.731 
4.541  4.353 
1.176  1.176 
500  500 
338  338 
338  338 
99  99 
94.744  91.013 
90.581  83.529 ).L, 
0'\ 
''•,  Chart 1 
Cum.ulative .GNP growth rates for t~e Union. 
Percentage i~ real terms. Ba$e 1992. 
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1998  1999 Table 3 · 
'  . 
Margins beneath the fi.nanci~l per!;pe.ctive ceilings~ Budget (B) and outturn {0). 
..  ECU ·million· at current prices 
.  . 
I  I 
1993  19.94  1995  1996  1997  19,98  1999 
8  o·  B  0  B  0  B  0  B  Provis. 0  B  0  B  0 
\ 
1. Common agri. policy  1.305  •,  1.625  1.678  3.495  1.050  . 3.441- 0  .1.468  1.000  1.382  2.826 
Monetary reserve  0  1.000  ·o  1.000  0  500  ·o  500  0  500  0  ' 
-
2. Structural operations  b  14  0  1.746  0  2.086  0  517  0  1.399  0 
Structural Funds  ·  0  14  0  1.746  0  2.068  0  496  0  1.394  .  0 
.. 
Cohesion Fund  0  0  '.0  0  0  o.  0  0  0  0  0  '  -
EEA fina~cial  ,mechanism  - '- - - 0  18  0  .  '  2,1  0  5  0 
3. Internal polici~s  1  . '43  5  31  5  42  '  16  118  2  84  247  -. 
4. External action ·  5  35  14  40  '22  157  0  66  21  146  ·470 
•' 
Emergency aid reserve  ci  0  ·o  '  0  0  0 
.. 
5. Administration  ·  4  56 
',  0  53  23  98  7  70  68  143  188 
; 
Loan guarantee reserve  298  299  0  24  ,0'  72  0  91  . 0  .  43  0 
7.  Compe~sation  - - - - 0  0  0  0  ,'  0  0  0 
Total cpmmitments  1.~13  3.072  1.697  '  6.389  1.100  6.397  24  2.831  '1.092  4.026  3.731 




Margins beneath the financial perspective ceilings. Total expenditure in commitments and payments. 
Budget and outturn. ECU million at current prices. 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
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Appropriations for commitments not imple~ented. 
.  ECU million (at current prices) 
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Appropriations for payments not implemented. 
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Provisional frgures for 1997 
•Heading 4. 
IJHeading 3 
DHeading 2 Table 4: 
Average annual rate of increase, 1993_ to 19_99  in real 
terms, of expenditure ceilings in ,initial-financial 
perspective 
Average annual growth rate(%).  ' 
Ceilings  ·  ·'  At current prices  . 
,_. 
-
Initial financial perspeGtive  Financial perspective after 
for EUR 12  adjustment for enlargement 
1. Common agricultural policy  .. 
'·  Guideline 
2,  Structural operc:~tions  ·  5,5  6,4 
-
. 3.  Internal policies  4,4  -·  5,8 
4.  External action  6,0  - -·  '7, 1 
-
5. Administrative expenditure  2,9  3,8 
-
.. 
Total appropriations for commitment  3,3  3,9 
Total appropriations for payments  '.  3,3  . 3,9 
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